This paper investigates whether the level of investor protection affects the choice between a full
scale merger and a purchase of a controlling stake in an acquisition, and examines the consequences of
these decisions on target shareholders’ welfare. Using a sample of 10,402 acquisitions from 38 countries
between 1990 and 2003, I find that targets from countries with poor investor protection are more likely to
be acquired through a ‘control stake acquisition’ than a ‘merger’ thereby creating inter-corporate control
chains. The returns to target minority shareholders in low protection countries are significantly positive in
both ‘control stake acquisitions’ and ‘mergers’, but they are substantially lower than those found in
countries with high investor protection.
학술대회/행사
학술대회안내
[2008년 제 4차] Investor Protection and the Mode of Acquisition:An
작성자 : 관리자
조회수 : 1056
게시일 :
2008-12-11